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JOHNSON v. DE GRANDY: MIXED MESSAGES ON
EQUAL ELECTORAL OPPORTUNITY UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Brenda Wright*
INTRODUCTION

Johnson v. De Grandy' is Florida's contribution to the burgeoning Supreme
Court jurisprudence addressing the redistricting which followed the 1990 Census.2
That round of redistricting has been heavily influenced by Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which Congress amended in 1982 to prohibit election practices
that deny minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and
* Director, Voting Rights Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under La%%;
B-A.. 1979. Brn
Mawr College; J.D., 1982, Yale Law School. The author prepared a brief anicus curiae for the Law)ers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law in support of respondents in Johnson v De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647
(1994). She also represented African-American voters in Florida in related redistricting litigatton %hich vas
not before the Court in Johnson. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the '.ie's of the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. The author is indebted to Keuana Battle-Mason for
research assistance in preparing this article.
1. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
2. Johnson is the sixth Supreme Court decision on the merits to address claims arising out of the 1990
Census reapportionment and redistricting process; the others are Shaw v. Reno. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)
(recognizing a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action for white voters challenging allegedly -bizarre"
majority-minority congressional districts in North Carolina); Gro.e v. Emison. 113 S Ct 1075 (1993)
(holding federal court should not have enjoined state court redistricting litigation in Minnesota once state
court asserted jurisdiction over redistricting); Voinovich v. Quilter. 113 S.Ct, 1149 (1993) (holding Ohio's
creation of majority-black legislative districts did not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) (rejecting Massachusetts' challenge to method of allocating oerscas
federal employees for purposes of congressional reapportionment): United States Dep't of Commerce v.
Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992) (rejecting Montana's challenge to method of appartioning congressional stats).
In two more states, Louisiana and Georgia, cases raising challenges to post-1990 congressional redistricting
plans were argued on April 19, 1995. and are awaiting decision: United States v Hays, No.94-558, and
Louisiana v. Hays, No. 94-627; Miller v. Johnson. No. 94-631. Abrams v. Johnson. No 94-797. and United
States v. Johnson, No. 94-929. The Court has also summarily disposed of numerous other post-1990
redistricting cases. E.g., Arizonans for Fair Representation v Smington. 828 F. Supp. 684 (D. Ariz.)
(adopting court-ordered congressional redistricting plan for Arizona). ai'd sub non,. Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce v. Arizonans for Fair Representation. 113 S. Ct. 1573 (1993); Wesch v. Hunt. 785 F. Supp. 1491
(S.D. Ala.) (adopting court-ordered congressional redistricting plan for Alabama). afrd sub nom. Camp v.
Wesch, 504 U.S. 902 (1992); Nash v. Blunt. 797 F. Supp. 1488 (W.D Mo.) (upholding Missuri's
redistricting plan for state house of representatives against challenge under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 42
U-S.C. § 1973 (1988)), affd sub nont. African American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund . Blunt. 113 S.
Ct. 1809 (1993); Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.C. 1992) (adopting court-ordered congressional
and legislative redistricting plans for South Carolina). vacated and remanded sub non State'tde
Reapportionment Advisory Comm. v. Theodore, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993)
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elect candidates of their choice to office. 3 Because the composition of election
districts may have a powerful impact on the ability of racial or ethnic minorities to
elect candidates of their choice to office, 4 redistricting is among the practices
covered by the anti-dilution principles of Section 2. 5
In Johnson, the Supreme Court rejected Section 2 claims brought by Hispanic
and African-American voters alleging that Florida's legislative redistricting plan
unlawfully diluted their voting strength by unduly limiting the number of
legislative districts in which minority voters would comprise a majority of the
population.6 The Supreme Court held that because Florida's redistricting plan
provided the complaining minority groups with a proportional number of
supermajority legislative districts in which they could elect representatives of their
choice to office, the State's failure to create additional majority-minority districts
did not violate the anti-dilution standard of Section 2.7 The Johnson majority was

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 2 provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account or race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(i)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.
Id.
4. For example, in the last 12 years no white-majority congressional district in the South has elected an
African-American representative to Congress. All 17 of the current African-American members of Congress
from the southern states are elected from majority-minority districts. See DAVID 0. BOSITIS, JOINT CENTER
FOR

POLITICAL AND
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(1995).

Researchers studying congressional and state legislative districts have concluded that the best way to predict
the presence of minority officeholding, particularly in the South, is to examine the racial composition of the
district. See Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Minority Population Proportion and Black and Hispanic
Congressional Success in the 1970s and 1980s, 17 AM. POL. Q. 436 (1989); Bernard Grofman & Lisa
Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16
LEGls. STUD. Q. 111 (1991).
5. Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1084-85.
6. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2652.
7. Id. at 2658-60.
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careful to state that such proportionality does not provide defendant jurisdictions
with a per se defense to a Section 2 claim,8 but held that the plaintiffs in Johnson
had not adequately demonstrated how the challenged plan denied them equal
political opportunity despite their ability to elect candidates of choice in a
proportional number of legislative districts.
Johnson's core holding did not break startling new ground. Eight years earlier,
in the leading case of Thornburg v. Gingles,10 a Supreme Court majority led by
Justice Brennan also concluded that proportional minority electoral success could,
depending upon the circumstances, defeat a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act."" Thus, recognizing a proportionality defense does not deal
a devastating new blow to Section 2 enforcement, especially because the Johnson
Court expressly declined to make the defense absolute.
Indeed, Johnson's significance lies partly in its failure to make any abrupt break
with the analytical framework laid out by the more liberal Court that decided
Thornburg v. Gingles in 1986. The Gingles framework has provided relatively
favorable standards for the evaluation of claims under Section 2, emphasizing
objective, empirically verifiable measures of minority electoral opportunity, such as
whether voting is racially polarized and whether white bloc voting has prevented
minorities from electing candidates of their choice to office.1" The Johnson decision
probably introduces a somewhat greater degree of uncertainty in the disposition of
Section 2 cases by emphasizing the broader "totality of circumstances" standard
set forth in the text of Section 2.13 At the same time, however, the Supreme Court
stressed in Johnson that the Section 2 analysis focuses on "equal electoral
opportunity,"114 making it likely that evidence of racially polarized voting patterns
and persistent minority electoral defeat will continue to take center stage in
8. Id. at 2661.
9. Id. at 2651, 2663.
10. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
11. Id. at 75-78. As explained in the text accompanying notes 65-72. infra. the plaintiffs' primary
argument in Johnson was not that they were entitled to a greater than proportional number of majorityminority election districts, but instead that Florida's redistricting plan did not in fact provide minorities with a
proportional number of districts when measured by the statewide percentage of minority population. Johnson.
114 S.Ct. at 2662 n.18. The Supreme Court, however, held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a
statewide claim of vote dilution, and that the proper reference point forproportionality was therefore the
minority population in South Florida rather than the state as a whole. Id.at 2662. Future litigants are
presumably forewarned to frame the geographic scope of their complaint with precision so as to avo:d such
pitfalls.
12. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15.
13. Johnson, 114 S.Ct. at 2656-57; see infra text accompanying notes 94-131.
14. Id. at 2657-58.
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determining whether an election scheme unlawfully dilutes minority voting
strength under Section 2, as has been true since Gingles.15
Furthermore, the Court's decision in Johnson offers clarity on at least one
question that has vexed Section 2 litigation since Congress amended Section 2 in
1982: what is the meaning of Section 2's proviso stating that "nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population"? 16 Johnson holds that the proviso
refers to minority electoral success, not to the voting power enjoyed by minorities
when election districts are created in which they constitute a majority of the
voters.17 Election districts in which minorities are a majority of the population do
not provide minority candidates with a guaranteed number of seats on the elected
body; they merely provide minority voters an opportunity to elect a candidate of
their choice to office. 18 The proviso, therefore, does not prevent courts from
treating the number of majority-minority districts in a redistricting plan as
important evidence of whether the plan unlawfully dilutes minority voting
strength.19
Finally, Johnson offers an intriguing contrast with Shaw v. Reno,20 in which the
Court opened the door to Fourteenth Amendment challenges to "bizarre"
majority-minority election districts. 2' Despite Shaw v. Reno's harsh criticisms of

15. See infra text accompanying notes 112-31.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
17. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2658 n.11.
18. Id.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
20. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). See infra text accompany notes 148-62.
21. In Shaw, the Court for the first time recognized a claim of reverse discrimination in redistricting
despite the white plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate any vote dilution or other traditionally cognizable injury.
Shaw's departure from prior redistricting precedent and its failure to articulate objective and manageable
standards for applying the cause of action it recognized, have been the focus of considerable academic
comment. See, e.g.. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588 (1993); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Essay,
Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral
Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good
Intentions With Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994); Pamela S. Karlan, All
Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245; Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH L. REv. 483 (1993); Thomas C. Goldstein, Note, Unpacking and
Applying Shaw v. Reno, 43 AM. U. L REv. 1135 (1994); Note, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, Leading
Cases, 107 HARV. L. REv. 194 (1993); Conference, The Supreme Court, Racial Politics, and the Right to
Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1994). But cf Daniel D.
Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problem of Racial GerrymanderingUnder the Voting
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the very notion of creating race-conscious election districts, a solid six-member
majority of the Court in Johnson reaffirmed the core vote dilution principles
grounding Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; further, the Court acknowledged
that equality of electoral opportunity as guaranteed by Section 2 will often depend
upon the number of election districts in which minorities constitute a majority of
the population, even though proportionality alone is not dispositive.as
Indeed, the Johnson decision reveals a potentially significant divergence between
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy in their interpretation of Shaw. Justice
O'Connor, the author of Sha'v, declined to reiterate Shaw's criticisms of majorityminority districts and wrote a concurring opinion in Johnson stating that, while
'
not dispositive, "[lack of proportionality is probative evidence of vote dilution. 2
Justice Kennedy, a member of the Shaw majority, wrote a separate concurrence to
warn that Section 2, as interpreted by the majority, would foster race-conscious
governmental action in drawing district lines. 2' This, in his view, "raises the most
serious constitutional questions. ' 25 Because both Justices were part of the narrow
5-4 majority in Shaw, this divergence may hold the key to whether Shaw was
merely the opening salvo in a coming all-out assault on majority-minority election
districts, or whether instead the theory announced in Shaw applies only to a
2
narrow category of truly bizarre redistricting plans. 1

. THE BACKGROUND OF JOHNSON
Florida's congressional and state legislative redistricting process spawned a
complex set of lawsuits in both state and federal court in 1992.27 By the time the
Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652 (1993) (approving Shaw's condemnation of noncompact districts but
arguing federal requirement of compactness should apply to all congressional districts, not merely those
created under Voting Rights Act). See also Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionalityof Racial Redistricting:A
Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L REV. 1 (1995).
22. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2558-59, 2661; id. at 2664 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
23. Id. at 2664.
24. Id. at 2666.
25. Id.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 150-64.
27. The first to file suit over redistricting in Florida was Miguel De Grandy, a Republican legislator
from Dade County. Joined by other Republican party leaders, legislators, and voters. De Grandy filed a
complaint in federal court challenging the malapportionment of Florida's congressional and legislative districts
on January 14, 1992, the first day of the 1992 Florida legislative session. See De Grandy v. Wetherell. 815 F.
Supp. 1550, 1554 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (three-judge court), affd in part. rev'd in part sub noam. Johnson v. De
Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2651 (1994). Florida's Hispanic population in south Florida is largely Republican,
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dust settled, Florida had a congressional redistricting plan drawn by a three-judge
federal district court in Tallahassee.2 8 Florida also had a state legislative

redistricting plan which was (in chronological order): enacted by the legislature; 20
approved by the Florida Supreme Court;30 disapproved in part by the United
States Department of Justice;31 redrawn by the Florida Supreme Court to
overcome the Justice Department's objection; 2 struck down in part, as redrawn,
by the three-judge federal district court; 3 and finally reinstated by the Supreme
3

Court. '
The central legal issue that consumed the attention of so many different organs
of government-state and federal, executive, legislative and judicial-was the
proper application of the Voting Rights Act to Florida's redistricting efforts.
However, as in many post-1990 redistricting lawsuits, the interests of the two
major political parties and of individual incumbents were overlaid on the claims of
minority voters, making a complex stew of civil rights advocacy and partisan
maneuvering."
At the outset of the litigation over Florida's legislative redistricting plan, various
plaintiffs and intervenors challenged districts drawn in several areas of the state,

and the De Grandy plaintiffs therefore enjoyed the substantial benefit of support from the Republican
National Committee. Democrats, who had majorities in both houses of the legislature that enacted the plan,
were cast as the defendants in the litigation over legislative redistricting. The African-American groups and
voters who alleged that the legislative plan also diluted their voting strength therefore became co-plaintiffs
with the Hispanic, Republican plaintiffs. Numerous other parties, including legislators, private citizens, the
NAACP, and eventually the United States, ultimately joined the federal litigation by filing separate lawsuits
that were consolidated with De Grandy v. Wetherell, or by obtaining leave to intervene in the De Grandy
lawsuit. De Grandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1555.
The state court litigation, on the other hand, was initiated by the Florida Attorney General, who
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for approval of the state legislative redistricting plan that was finally
adopted by the Florida Legislature on April 10, 1992. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G,
597 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1992). Most of the plaintiffs and intervenors in the federal court litigation also
participated in the Florida Supreme Court proceedings as opponents of the state's redistricting plan, alleging
that it failed adequately to protect minority voting rights. Id. at 282.
28. De Grandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (three-judge court). The congressional
plan was created by the three-judge federal court because the Florida Legislature deadlocked over
congressional redistricting and never enacted a plan.
29. Senate Joint Resolution 2G (1992) [hereinafter SJR 2G].
30. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1992).
31. See Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2652 n.2.
32. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1992).
33. De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (three-judge court), aff'd In part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2697 (1994).
34. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
35. See supra note 27.

JOHNSON V. DE GRANDY

107

including Hillsborough County (Tampa), Escambia County, and South Florida,
for unlawfully diluting minority voting strength. By the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, however, the remaining claims at issue all related to the legislative

districts drawn in South Florida. 6 In South Florida, the Hispanic and Republican
plaintiffs, joined by the United States, alleged dilution of Hispanic voting strength
in the drawing of the State's House and Senate districts.3 7 The NAACP joined
them in challenging the configuration of the State's Senate districts for unlawfully
diluting African-American voting strength.3 8
Florida's plan for the State House of Representatives limited Hispanics to voting
age population (VAP) majorities in 9 House districts, although the De Grandy
plaintiffs demonstrated that 11 such districts could be created in the Dade County
area. 9 For the Florida Senate, the legislature's plan created 2 majority-black VAP
Senate districts and 3 majority-Hispanic VAP districts.' African Americans and
Hispanics both alleged that the legislature's configuration diluted their voting
strength by failing to create 1 additional African-American or Hispanic majority
Senate district."1
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their challenge to the House
plan and ordered into effect a remedial plan creating 11 Hispanic majority
districts.42 The court's analysis closely tracked the standards for proving a Section

36. See Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2652 nn.2 & 4. None of the parties prosecuted an appzal from the
federal district court's order establishing a court-ordered congressional redistricting plan. De Grandy v.
Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (three-judge court). That plan resulted in the creation of three
African-American majority districts which, in November 1992, elected Florida's first African-American
representatives to Congress since Reconstruction-Congresswoman Corrine Brown from Jacksonville,
Congresswoman Carrie Meek from Miami, and Congressman Alcee Hastings from Ft. Lauderdale. Howev'er,
one of these districts, the Third Congressional District represented by Congresswoman Corrine Brown, has
now been challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Shaw v. Reno in a nem lawsuit filed
by a white candidate who ran unsuccessfully for the seat in 1992. Johnson v. Smith. No. 94-40025 WS (N.D.
Fla. filed July 18, 1994). Similarly, none of the parties prosecuted an appeal from the Florida Supreme
Court's order establishing a majority-black state senate district in the Tampa Bay area. In re Constitutionality
of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1992). But that district, too, has been challenged in a new
lawsuit filed in 1994 under Shaw v. Reno. Scott v. United States. No. 94-622-CIV-T-23C (M.D. Fla. filed
May 2, 1994). The federal court also approved a consent decree to increase the district's African-American
population by redrawing a Florida House district in Escambia County. and no appeal was taken from that
order. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2652 nn.2 & 4.
37. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
38. Id.
39. De Grandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1581.
40. In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So. 2d at 282-83.
41. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2652.
42. Adjudication of these claims was delayed-and later took place in an extremely hurried trial in late
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2 vote dilution claim set forth in Gingles.'s In Gingles, the Supreme Court
identified three factors (often referred to as the Gingles factors) which the Court
deemed central to proof of a Section 2 violation:

First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district. . . . Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is
politically cohesive ....
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that

the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it in the absence of
special circumstances

. . usually to defeat the minority's preferred

candidate.4 4

June of 1992, as candidate qualifying was about to begin-because of a unique feature of Florida redistricting
law. Under the Florida Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court was required to review and approve any
legislative redistricting plan enacted by the legislature before it could become law. FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 16.
Moreover, even if that approval was granted, the legislature's plan could not be implemented unless the
United States Justice Department granted preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(c). Until these proceedings were complete, the federal district court could not determine how to
proceed. If approval were denied by the Florida Supreme Court or the Justice Department, then no
legislatively enacted plan would be in place, and the federal court's role would be to enact a court-ordcrcd
redistricting plan so that elections could proceed. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); White v. Weiser,
412 U.S. 783 (1973). However, if the legislature's plan passed both these hurdles and became law, the federal
court's role would be different; the court would be faced with a traditional Voting Rights Act claim, in which
the burden would be on the plaintiffs to prove that the legislature's plan unlawfully diluted their voting
strength. Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1084.
While preparation for the federal trial proceeded, the parties to the federal court litigation all convened
before the Florida Supreme Court to argue the question whether SJR 2G unlawfully diluted minority voting
strength or was otherwise subject to rejection by the Florida Supreme Court. The time constraints imposed on
the Florida Supreme Court's review process, however, essentially precluded any meaningful adjudication of
the parties' vote dilution claims. The Florida Supreme Court therefore found SJR 2G to be "facially" valid,
reserving for possible later litigation the question whether the plan might in fact dilute minority voting
strength. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1992). Despite this
approval, the Justice Department subsequently objected to the state senate plan as it affected Hillsborough
County, based on evidence that the state's refusal to draw a majority-minority district there had a racially
discriminatory purpose and impact. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, to Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, 2-3 (June 16, 1992) (on file with the District
of Columbia Law Review). After the Justice Department objected, the Florida Supreme Court invited
interested parties to submit proposed remedial plans and, by a narrow 4-3 vote, adopted the plan submitted by
the group of African American intervenors represented by this author. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint
Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1992). That plan, as modified by the Florida Supreme Court, then
became the subject of the South Florida vote dilution challenge tried in the federal district court.
43. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
44. Id. at 50-51.
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Racially polarized voting patterns which resulted in the usual defeat of minoritypreferred candidates were thus key elements of a Section 2 claim under Gingles,
proof of other factors indicating an absence of electoral equality, the Gingles
Court held, were "supportive of, but not essential to"45 proving a Section 2
violation.
The district court in Johnson found that the plaintiffs established all three of the
Gingles factors. The redistricting plan submitted by the Hispanic plaintiffs
"provided for 11 reasonably compact districts" with Hispanic VAP majorities,'
compared to only 9 in SJR 2G. The district court also found that Hispanics were
politically cohesive, in that they usually provided overwhelming support for
Hispanic candidates in legislative elections, and that non-Hispanic voters, by
7
contrast, engaged in a high degree of bloc voting against Hispanic candidates.'
The district court found that because of these racially polarized voting patterns,
Hispanic voters were generally unable to elect candidates of their choice except in
districts where they formed an effective voting majority.4' Going beyond the
Gingles factors, the court also found that Hispanics had suffered from Statesponsored discrimination and that direct appeals to racial prejudice in election
campaigns were not uncommon.' The evidence, in the court's view, summed to a
standard case of vote dilution with respect to Florida's House districts.
On the Senate side, however, the district court reached a different conclusion.
The court entered judgment for the State, holding that neither Hispanics nor
African Americans could form a majority in an additional State Senate district
without diluting the voting strength of the other minority group. °

IH. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

The State of Florida appealed the district court's judgment striking down the
House plan, and the minority plaintiffs and the United States cross-appealed the
court's judgment upholding the Senate plan.51 The parties endured a long and

45. Id. at 49 n.15.
46. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2655 (citing De Grandy'. 815 F. Supp. at 1580).
47. De Grandy, 815 F. Supp. at 1572.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1574.
50. Id. at 1574. 1580.
51. The State also successfully sought a stay of the district court's judgment pending appeal, halting the
implementation of the district court's redistricting plan and permitting the State to hold 1992 electons under
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suspenseful wait for the Supreme Court's decision; both Johnson and Holder v.
Hall,52 another voting rights case, were argued on the first day of the Court's 1993
Term-October 4, 1993-but were not decided until the very last day of the
term-June 30, 1994. Expectations of a revolution in Section 2 jurisprudence grew
as the end of the term approached with no decision.
In Johnson, at least, the revolution failed to materialize.5" A surprisingly broad
six-member majority decided Johnson, with a seventh Justice joining most of the
majority opinion. Justice Souter wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Ginsburg, with Justice
Kennedy joining in portions. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, although they
actually agreed with the disposition of the case reached by the majority-that is,
rejection of the vote dilution claims of the minority plaintiffs and the United
States." Justice Souter summarized the holding of Johnson as follows:
We hold that no violation of § 2 can be found here, where, in spite of
continuing discrimination and racial bloc voting, minority voters form
effective voting majorities in a number of districts roughly proportional to the
minority voters' respective shares in the voting-age population. While such
proportionality is not dispositive in a challenge to single-member districting, it
is a relevant fact in the totality of circumstances to be analyzed when
determining whether members of a minority group have "less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice." 55

its challenged redistricting plan. Wetherell v. De Grandy, 113 S. Ct. 1 (1992).
52. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
53. It appears that Holder was the more controversial decision for the members of the Court, judging
by the absence of any majority opinion in that case. Holder involved a § 2 challenge by African-American
voters in Bleckley County, Georgia, to the county's sole-commissioner form of government. Holder is analyzed
in a separate article by Laughlin McDonald, Holder v. Hall, Blinking at Minority Voting Rights, 3 D C L.
REV. 61 (1995).
54. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a lengthy concurring opinion criticizing the Voting
Rights Act in Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. at 2592, which, by reference, provided the basis of their dissent in
Johnson. 114 S.Ct. at 2667. In these opinions, Justices Thomas and Scalia asserted that § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act does not apply to practices that dilute minority voting strength, a conclusion that can only be
described as startling in light of the text and legislative history of amended § 2. Holder, 114 S.Ct. at 2627-29
(Stevens, J.,dissenting). Justices Thomas and Scalia, however, found themselves marginalized in these key
voting rights decisions; no other justice joined them in Holder or in Johnson, and the Johnson majority
completely ignored the Thomas/Scalia dissent.
55. Id. at 2651 (quoting § 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
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To reach this simply-stated conclusion, the Court first had to clear away much

underbrush. The Court began by dismissing Florida's argument that the district
court was obligated to give preclusive effect to the judgment of the Florida

Supreme Court upholding SJR 2G. Those plaintiffs who were parties to the
Florida Supreme Court proceedings, the Court held, did not have a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate""" their Section 2 claims in the state court. 7 Accordingly, a
res judicata defense was unavailable. 8 The Court also rejected the State's
argument that the Rooker/Feldman doctrine barred the United States from
challenging SJR 2G in federal court."9
The Court then turned to the merits of plaintiffs' Section 2 vote dilution claim.

Two redistricting cases decided the previous term, Voinovich and Growe, had
already established a significant ground rule for Section 2 challenges to singlemember districting plans. Such claims, like claims alleging vote dilution through

56. Id. at 2654 (quoting Allen v. McCurry. 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980)).
57. Id. The Florida Supreme Court did not hold a trial and acknowledged that it was unable "to
conduct the complete factual analysis contemplated by the Voting Rights Act." In re Senate Joint Resolution
2G, 597 So. 2d at 282. The decision of the Florida Supreme Court approving SJR 2G noted that the parties
were free to pursue further their § 2 claims in the supreme court by requesting appointment of a special
master to conduct evidentiary proceedings. Id. at 285. Nevertheless, the mere fact that plaintiffs could have,
but did not, litigate further their claims in the Florida Supreme Court was irrelevant. Johnson held. becaust
"plaintiffs are free to litigate in any court with jurisdiction." Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2654.
58. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2654.
59. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of App--als
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The Rooker/Feldman doctrine bars a party whose claims were decided
adversely in a state forum from initiating a federal court challenge on the same claims %here such a lawsuit
would effectively require the lower federal court to exercise appellate review of the state court's judgment. In
Johnson, the Court explained that the doctrine was inapplicable to the United States because the United
States was not a party to the state court proceeding. Curiously, the State did not argue that the claims of the
private plaintiffs, who were parties in the state court proceeding, were barred by the Roaker/Feldman
doctrine, and the Supreme Court, therefore, did not have to address that question.
Even as applied to the private plaintiffs, however, the Rooker/Feldnan doctrine would not have barred
the claims. Neither the claims of the private parties nor those of the United States in Johnson involved the
type of direct attack on a state court judgment that is barred by the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. In Rooker.
plaintiffs' federal court action directly requested a federal district court to declare "null and void" a judgment
entered by a state court. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414. In Feldman. plaintiffs filed a lawsuit naming the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals as a defendant to challenge that court's refusal to admit them to the bar.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 468 n.2, 472 n.8. In Johnson. none of the parties reguested the federal district court set
aside or review any judgment by the Florida Supreme Court; instead, they sued executive and legislative
officials of the State of Florida in order to litigate their claim that the State's redistricting plan violated § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. Because the Florida Supreme Court did not adjudicate any § 2 claims on the merits.
the federal court action could not be properly characterized as even an indirect effort to obtain lowsr federal
court review of a state court judgment.
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the use of multimember districts, require proof of the three Gingles factors:"0
sufficient minority population to draw additional single-member districts, minority
political cohesion, and white bloc voting which generally defeats minoritypreferred candidates."'
The district court in Johnson found that the evidence established all three of
these factors. However, none of these findings engaged the Supreme Court's
attention. As the Supreme Court noted, the State did not challenge the district
court's findings of Hispanic political cohesion and bloc voting by non-Hispanics,
the second and third Gingles factors.62 However, the State did have complaints
about the district court's findings on the first Gingles factor, arguing that the
Hispanic population was insufficient to support two additional majority-Hispanic
districts, but the Court declined to decide that issue.6 3 Instead, the Court
"assume[d] without deciding that even if Hispanics are not an absolute majority of
the relevant population in the additional districts, the first Gingles condition has
been satisfied in these cases.""
The Court then turned to what it deemed the central issue: "whether, even with
all three Gingles conditions satisfied, the circumstances in totality support a
finding of vote dilution when Hispanics can be expected to elect their chosen
representatives in substantial proportion to their percentage of the area's
population." 6 5 The very formulation of this question, however, assumed the answer
to one of the thorniest issues actually presented by the case: how to define and
measure "proportional" minority representation.
With a total statewide Hispanic population of 12%, and 9 majority-Hispanic
House districts out of 120 (amounting to only 7.5% of the seats), Hispanics
clearly did not enjoy proportional representation under SJR 2G unless the Court
defined proportionality by some measure narrower than statewide Hispanic
population. The State offered two possible methods to lower the apparent
percentage of the Hispanic population and thus bolster its proportionality defense:
(1) do not count any Hispanic who is a non-citizen; and/or (2) do not count
statewide Hispanic population, but only the Hispanic population in the area where

60. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (applying amended § 2 to claims of vote dilution through use of
multimember legislative districts).
61. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2654-55 (citing Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1084 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at So51)).
62. Id. at 2655.
63. Id. at 2655-56.
64. Id. at 2656.
65. Id. at 2655.
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the Hispanic-majority districts were proposed, South Florida. Each of these
alternatives, however, was subject to serious objections.0 0 The Supreme Court,
therefore, employed a time-honored method of sidestepping thorny legal issues,
07
ruling that the plaintiffs had waived the key argument supporting their position.
The Court held that the plaintiffs had limited their allegations and proof to the
Dade County/South Florida region, and thus had forfeited the right to rely on
statewide Hispanic population as the appropriate measure of proportionality.a
This move was crucial. As soon as the Court decided that the proportion of
Hispanics in South Florida or Dade County was the appropriate benchmark for
the claims in Johnson, proportional representation as a factual issue dropped out
of the case; the State's plan now unquestionably provided Hispanics in South
Florida and Dade County with roughly proportional representation, whether
measured by total Hispanic population or Hispanic voting age population. 0 As the
Court stated, "[t]hus we have no occasion to decide which frame of reference
66. The argument that non-citizens may be excluded in assessing the proportionality of representation is
based on the fact that the word "citizens" is used in § 2: "A violation ... is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
[the Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). This does not establish, however, that non-citizens must be ignored in
measuring whether representation for a minority group is roughly proportional so as to bar relief under § 2.
The statute does not by its terms command any particular measure of proportional representation, nor des it
even state that proportional representation is a bar to a § 2 claim. Persons ineligible to vote arc nevertheless
entitled to petition their legislators, seek their assistance, and endeavor to influence legislative policymaking.
Capping minority representation in a redistricting plan by use of citizen population instead of total population
would infringe those rights by treating those ineligible to vote as nonpersons. See Garza v. County of Los
Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 775 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991). Moreover, total
population-including non-citizens and persons not yet of voting age-is consistently used as the measure of
equal voting strength under the one-person, one-vote doctrine grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). It is also used by the states
themselves when dividing their legislative seats among different regions of the state. Total population,
therefore, is no less appropriate as a measure of equal voting strength under the Voting Rights Act.
Moreover, the appropriate reference for a defense of "proportional representation" is the percentage of
minorities in the state as a whole, not their percentage in an arbitrarily defined sub-region of the state. Using
a smaller region as a reference is subject to endless manipulation, given that some area could always be
defined in which minorities voters would appear to enjoy proportional representation. At the most fundamental
level, even if a state has only one majority-minority election district, minorities in that district have
proportional representation regardless of how many additional districts could be drawn.
67. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2662.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2658. If Hispanic non-citizens were also excluded from the calculus. even a statewide
reference point would not have established underrepresentation in the State's plan. Id. at 2662 n.18. By
finding that plaintiffs had made only a regional claim, however, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on
whether such an exclusion would be appropriate. Id.

114

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

should have been used if the parties had not apparently agreed in the District
Court on the appropriate geographical scope for analyzing the alleged § 2 violation
.... "70 The only question then remaining, in the Court's view, was whether proof
of the three Gingles factors automatically required a finding of vote dilution and
the creation of additional majority-minority districts, even though the State's plan
provided Hispanic voters with majority-minority districts in proportion to their
population. The Court's shorthand version of this question was whether vote
dilution under Section 2 may be equated with "failure to maximize the number of
reasonably compact majority-minority districts."7 1
It was not surprising to any observer that if the Court framed the question this
way, the answer would be "no." After all, eight years earlier, Gingles held, in the
context of a challenge to multimember legislative districts, that a sustained history
of proportional minority representation could suffice to defeat a Section 2
challenge, assuming such success could not be explained as the result of unusual
circumstances.72
The Johnson Court similarly concluded that a showing of proportional
representation may be sufficient to defeat a Section 2 challenge to a single-member
districting plan even when the Gingles factors are present. Without directly
repudiating the importance of the Gingles factors in structuring Section 2's
"totality of circumstances" test, the Johnson Court emphasized that the ultimate
question under Section 2 is whether the challenged scheme "den[ies] minority
voters equal electoral opportunity": 73
[I]f Gingles so clearly identified the three [factors] as generally necessary to
prove a § 2 claim, it just as clearly declined to hold them sufficient in
combination, either in the sense that a court's examination of relevant
circumstances was complete once the three factors were found to exist, or in
the sense that the three in combination necessarily and in all circumstances
demonstrated dilution. .

.

. To be sure, some § 2 plaintiffs may have easy

cases, but although lack of equal electoral opportunity may be readily
imagined and unsurprising when demonstrated under circumstances that
include the three essential Gingles factors, that conclusion must still be
addressed explicitly, and without isolating any other arguably relevant facts

70.
71.
72.
73.

Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2662.
Id.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77.
Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2658.
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74

from the act of judgment.

Thus, the three Gingles factors do not independently define a Section 2 violation,
necessary "ultimate conclusions about
but instead are tools in reaching the
71 5
opportunity.
of
inequality
equality or
What, then, did the Court view as the "other arguably relevant facts"70 that the
district court had not adequately considered? The Court identified only one:
proportionality, defined as the number of districts in which Hispanics comprised
effective voting majorities compared to the Hispanic population percentage in the
relevant area.7 7 As Justice Souter stated, "[treating equal political opportunity as
the focus of the enquiry, we do not see how these district lines, apparently
providing political effectiveness in proportion to voting-age numbers, deny equal
7 8
political opportunity.
The Supreme Court's holding plainly gave great weight to the proportional
representation afforded to South Florida Hispanics in the State's plan; it identified
no other factor supporting rejection of the plaintiffs' Section 2 challenge to the
State's House districts. 79 The Court nevertheless took great pains to emphasize
that proportional representation is not a per se bar to a claim of unlawful vote
dilution under Section 2.80 Prior to Johnson, several lower courts had granted
74. Id. at 2657 (citations and footnote omitted). Here. and in a number of delicately worded passagcs in
Johnson, Justice Souter's prose takes on a certain Henry Jamesian quality. Extraordinarily careful language
was evidently required to secure a six-member majority-including Justices Blackmun and Stevens on one
side, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor on the other-in a voting rights cas
75. Id; see also id. (defining "lack of equal electoral opportunity" as the "conclusion [whichl must...
be addressed explicitly"); id. at 2658 ("equal political opportunity" is "the focus of the inquiry").
76. Id. at 2657; see also id. at 2658 (referring to "the further circumstances with arguable bearing on
the issue of equal political opportunity").
77. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2658-59 & n.l ; id. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although the Court
referred to voting age population in its discussion of proportionality, the Court carefully refrained from ruling
that voting-age population must be deemed the preferred benchmark. Id. at 2660 n.14.
78. Id. at 2658.
79. On the same reasoning, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment denying relief to AfricanAmerican and Hispanic voters who challenged Florida's Senate redistricting plan. Both groups had roughly
proportional representation in the Senate plan in relation to their population numbers in South Florida, and
the plan therefore did not deny them equal political opportunity. Id. at 2663.
80. [W]hile proportionality in the sense used here is obviously an indication that minority voters
have an equal opportunity, in spite of racial polarization, 'to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice,' 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), the degree of probative value
assigned to proportionality may vary with other facts. No single statistic pro'ides courts with a
short-cut to determine whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully dilutes minority
voting strength.
Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2661-62 (footnote omitted).

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

defense motions for dismissal and/or summary judgment in Section 2 cases where
the challenged single-member district plan created majority-minority districts in
proportion to the minority population.8 1 The Johnson Court, however, gave three
reasons to reject the argument that proportional representation will always
forestall a successful Section 2 claim.
First, the Court held that creating what it termed a "safe-harbor" rule for
districting plans that provide proportional representation "would run counter to
the textual command of Section 2, that the presence or absence of a violation be
assessed 'based on the totality of circumstances.' ",82 The need for this "totality"
review, the Court asserted, "springs from the demonstrated ingenuity of state and
local governments in hobbling minority voting power." 83 Some of thepractices that
states and localities have used to limit minority voting power 4 "could occur even
in a jurisdiction with numerically demonstrable proportionality."8 Thus, nearly
thirty years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Court does not yet
trust states and localities enough to grant them per se exemptions from Section 2's
mandate of equal electoral opportunity. "It is, in short, for good reason that we
have been, and remain, chary of entertaining a simplification of the sort the State

81. E.g., African American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 999 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding that minority plaintiffs' challenge to St. Louis City Council districts was barred because plan
provided proportional representation), vacated for reconsiderationin light of Johnson v. De Grandy, sub norn.
Tyus v. Bosley, 114 S. Ct. 2776 (1994); Barnett v. Daley, 835 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. III. 1993) (dismissing § 2
and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Chicago City Council redistricting plan on basis that plan contained
proportional number of black-majority districts), rev'd, 32 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
82. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2660 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
83. Id. at 2660.
84. The Court's non-exhaustive list included:
ballot box stuffing, outright violence, discretionary registration, property requirements, the poll tax,
and the white primary; and other practices censurable when the object of their use is discriminatory,
such as at-large elections, runoff requirements, anti-single-shot devices, gerrymandering, the
impeachment of officeholders, the annexation or deannexation of territory, and the creation or
elimination of elective offices.
Id.
This list of potentially discriminatory election practices presents a puzzle which the Court did not explain:
what did the Court mean in apparently distinguishing certain "practices censurable when the object of their
use is discriminatory," id., from other practices not prefaced by that description? The Court could not have
meant that certain of the listed practices are actionable only when a jurisdiction employs them for an
invidiously discriminatory purpose; the first item in that list, at-large elections, is the quintessential practice
that may be challenged under Section 2 because of its discriminatory impact, regardless of any discriminatory
intent. The significance of the Court's apparent distinction among these different practices is therefore
obscure.
85. Id. at 2661.
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now urges upon us."' 88
Second, the Supreme Court was concerned that recognizing an automatic bar to
Section 2 claims based on proportional representation could encourage states to
adopt the kind of "balanced bottom line" defense that has been rejected in
contexts such as employment discrimination.8" Recognizing such a defense might
lead states to assume that "the rights of some minority voters under Section 2 may
be traded off against the rights of other members of the same minority class.""s
Overall proportional minority representation may conceivably mask unlawful
discrimination against a sub-group of the minority. 9 The Court therefore objected
to the view that "the most blatant racial gerrymandering in half of a county's
single-member districts would be irrelevant under Section 2 if offset by political
gerrymandering in the other half, so long as proportionality was the bottom

line."90
The Court's first two reasons for rejecting a "safe-harbor" rule based on
proportional representation seem sensible; the Court is simply recognizing the
statutory command of examining the "totality of circumstances" and is rightly

86. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2661.
87. E.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
88. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2661.
89. Precisely this claim was presented in an Eighth Circuit decision which the Supreme Court held
pending its decision in Johnson and then vacated for reconsideration in light of Johnson. African American
Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 999 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of summary
judgment against minority plaintiffs in vote dilution challenge to St. Louis City Council districts because plan
provided proportional representation to minorities), cert. granted. vacated and remanded sub non. Tyus v.
Bosley, 114 S. Ct. 2776 (1994).
90. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2661. See also id. at 2659. where the Court noted that a State. even when
its plan afforded minorities proportional representation, could potentially violate § 2 if it employed different
line-drawing criteria in minority neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. As the Court stated.
We would agree that where a State has split (or lumped) minority neighborhoods that would have
been grouped into a single district (or spread among several) if the State had employed the same
line-drawing standards in minority neighborhoods as it used elsewhere in the jurisdicuon, the
inconsistent treatment might be significant evidence of a § 2 violation, even in the face of
proportionality.
Id. The Court, however, went on to reject the Hispanic plaintiffs' argument that Florida had engaged in
precisely such differential treatment in drawing Hispanic districts in South Florida. Id. The Court noted that
the plaintiffs' claim appeared to rest only on the assertion that some Hispanic neighborhoods had been
"fragmented" and others had been unnecessarily "packed." Without indicating precisely Ahat further sho, ing
would be necessary to support a vote dilution claim on such a basis, the Court held that such characterizations
of the line-drawing process were insufficient to show vote dilution "when the minority group enjoys substantial
proportionality." Id. Plaintiffs seeking to overcome a defense of proportional representation therefore must
take care to document in detail precisely how the line-drawing techniques used in minority neighborhoods
differ from those used in non-minority neighborhoods.
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hesitant to immunize potentially discriminatory practices from scrutiny under the
Voting Rights Act. The Court's third and final reason for rejecting a per se
defense of proportionality, however, is more difficult to understand. According to
the Court, a rule exempting redistricting plans from challenge when they provide
minorities with proportional representation might lead states to draw majorityminority districts even when such districts are unnecessary to permit minorities to
elect candidates of their choice to office. "[T]he conclusiveness of the [safe-harbor]
rule," said the Court, "might be an irresistible inducement to create such
districts." 9' 1 There follows one of the many passages exemplifying Johnson's "on
the one hand, on the other hand" jurisprudence:
It bears recalling ...

that for all the virtues of majority-minority districts as

remedial devices, they rely on a quintessentially race-conscious calculus aptly
described as the "politics of second best." If the lesson of Gingles is that
society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority
districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity, that should not
obscure the fact that there are communities in which minority citizens are
able to form coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having
no need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect candidates of
their choice. Those candidates may not represent perfection to every minority
voter, but minority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul,
and trade to find common political ground, the virtue of which is not to be
slighted in applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in
92
American politics.
Clearly, there is something for everyone in this paragraph. For the liberal-tomoderate wing of the Johnson majority, the opinion acknowledges that race
conscious remedies such as majority-minority districts still have "virtues" by
permitting minorities to enjoy equal electoral opportunity. For the other Justices,
the passage indulges in the conservatives' beloved ritual of waxing optimistic about
race relations so as to obviate the need for corrective action (e.g., "there are
communities" in which majority-minority districts are unnecessary).9 3
91. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2661.
92. Id. at 2661 (citation omitted).
93. It is encouraging that Johnson approaches the need for the Voting Rights Act and its remedies as
an empirical question, one to be answered not by resort to political science slogans but instead by empirical
proof obtained on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. Conservative critics of the vote-dilution theory behind
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act have tended to rely on generalizations about the willingness of whites to support
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None of this, however, would seem to have much bearing on whether the Court
should or should not recognize a per se defense of proportionality for singlemember district plans. If the Court is worried about states' embracing too quickly
the creation of majority-minority districts, it is not necessarily logical to address
that concern by refusing to narrow the range of circumstances which may give rise
to Section 2 liability. By rejecting a "safe-harbor" exemption for plans that
provide minorities with proportional representation, the Court is telling states and
localities that their obligation to consider minority political opportunity is not
necessarily satisfied once they include a proportional number of majority-minority
districts in their redistricting plans. When proportionality does not provide a safe
harbor, states nevertheless may rationally regard it as a minimum requirement-in
effect, a floor for avoiding vote dilution problems. It is not really the absence of a
safe-harbor defense, but the requirement of proving racial bloc voting as a
predicate to a Section 2 claim, that limits the necessity of drawing majorityminority districts in particular jurisdictions where such voting patterns may not be
present.

11.
A.

THE LESSONS OF JOHNSON

Thornburg v. Gingles: Were the Rumors of its Death Exaggerated?

Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court's first interpretation of amended Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, established a regime which gave focus and structure to the
Section 2 analysis by placing great weight on factors susceptible to objective
measurement and verification. Justice Brennan, joined on this point by four other
members of the Court, singled out the three factors of minority population size,
minority political cohesion (i.e., minority bloc voting for candidates), and the
defeat of minority-preferred candidates through white bloc voting as necessary

black candidates, without offering empirical support for their beliefs. See. e.g., ABIGAIL M THENSTRO.tL
WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRNATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHras (1987); cf Pamela S. Karlan
& Peyton McCrary, Without Fearand Without Research. Abigail Thernstrorn on the Voting Rights Act. 4 J
L. & POL 751, 760-61 (1988). Careful empirical analysis of voting systems on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
basis overwhelmingly confirms that in the southern states, where the most exhausting research has been
conducted, minority officeholding is heavily dependent upon the creation of majority-minority election
districts. See QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTs ACT 1965-1990
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION). See also FiRNK R
PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL F-MPOWERMENT IN MISsiSSIPPI AFTER 1965 at 192-97 (1992)
(empirical rebuttal of Thernstrom's arguments).
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preconditions to a Section 2 claim.9 4 The Gingles majority held that other factors
are relevant but not essential to demonstrating a Section 2 violation.96 Barring
problems that occasionally arise in obtaining base data,96 the Gingles factors can
be determined objectively through empirical investigation of election results and
census data.

To be sure, lower courts applying Gingles were generally careful to acknowledge
that a finding of Section 2 liability depends upon an analysis of the "totality of
circumstances," and opinions in Section 2 cases generally discussed the so-called
"Senate Report factors ' 97 as well as the three so-called Gingles factors before
rendering judgment.98 Nevertheless, the framework established in Gingles enabled
the lower courts to develop, over time, a reasonably consistent approach to the
potentially amorphous "totality of circumstances" test of Section 2.90 The Gingles
94. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
95. Id. at 48-49 n.15.
96. For examples of the problems that can arise and methods that have been used to overcome them, see
Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 4 F.3d 1103, 1118 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2779
(1994); Holder v. Hall, 955 F.2d 1563, 1569-71 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2581
(1994); Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986).
97. The Senate Report accompanying amended Section 2 lists the following "typical factors" which
courts may consider in determining Section 2 claims:
1.the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched
the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been
denied access to that process;
5.the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction.
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 (footnotes omitted).
The Senate Report notes two additional factors that may be relevant in some cases: whether elected officials
have been unresponsive to the needs of the minority group, and whether the state or local policy underlying
the use of the challenged electoral device is tenuous. Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted).
98. E.g., East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of Jefferson, 926 F.2d 487, 491 (5th
Cir. 1991) ("In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the court should consider the (Senate Report)
factors listed ....").
99. See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendment of Section 2 and Minority Representation, In
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 70 (Chandler Davidson &
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factors, which bear directly on the extent to which minorities enjoy equal electoral
opportunity in the jurisdiction, thus became the centerpiece of Section 2 litigation,
with other factors generally playing a secondary role.100 A test focused on the
objective Gingles factors has generally been seen as advantageous to minority
plaintiffs.101 By contrast, other factors that had been featured in some court
decisions prior to the amendment of Section 2 and that were listed in the Senate
Report accompanying amended Section 2-such as the elected body's
"responsiveness" to minority concerns-are open to far more subjective
assessments. 102 What constitutes "responsiveness"? Are white elected officials to be
deemed "responsive" as long as they listen politely to minority constituents, or
does "responsiveness" require substantive action on minority concerns? If the
latter, then how much action? Placing greater weight on the objectively verifiable
Gingles factors not only seems more closely related to the statutory standard of
equal political opportunity set forth in Section 2, but also produces greater
predictability and uniformity in the application of Section 2 to state and local
election plans. Furthermore, under a subjective "know-it-when-I-see-it" test for
political equality, with all factors potentially entitled to whatever weight an

Bernard Grofman eds., 1992).
100. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mici. L. REv. 1833, 1853 & cases cited at n.100 (1992).
101. See Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights. 42 VA,,aD L REV.
1249, 1269, 1279-80 (1989) (noting that 1982 amendment of § 2 and Glngles's objective standards added
predictability to vote dilution cases, reduced likelihood that judges reviewing similar evidence would reach
opposite conclusions regarding vote dilution, and streamlined litigation and settlement of such cases). Of
course, there are instances in which treating the Gingles factors as dispositive has prevented § 2 plaintiffs from
pursuing apparently meritorious claims of unequal electoral opportunity. E.g.. McNeil v. Springfield Park
Dist., 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989) (upholding grant of summary
judgment for defendant in § 2 lawsuit solely because plaintiffs could not show that they would form majority
of voting age population in single-member district, even though other circumstances indicated that remedial
plan would permit them opportunity to elect candidate of choice without constituting a majority). But cf.
Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio. 1991) (three-judge court) (finding § 2 violation although
minorities could not satisfy Gingles factor one by showing that they would comprise majority in singlemember district).
102. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 97, at 29. Congress indicated, through the Senate Report, that
"[u]nresponsiveness is not an essential part of plaintiff's case" under amended § 2, and that "defendants' proof
of some responsiveness would not negate plaintiffs showing by other, more objective factors enumerated here
that minority voters nevertheless were shut out of equal access to the political process." Id. at 29 n.l 16. See
also H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1981) (stating that effects test of amended § 2 "avoids
highly subjective factors such [as] responsiveness"); Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA L REv 715, 758-61 (1983) (discussing lower
courts' conflicting analyses of responsiveness prior to amendment of § 2, and noting Congres's determination
that proof of unresponsiveness would no longer be necessary under amended § 2).
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individual judge might assign, Section 2 claims could face rough sledding before
the current overwhelmingly conservative federal judiciary.
In Gingles, however, four members of the Court had declined to join Justice
Brennan's opinion which singled out the three factors of minority population size,
minority political cohesion, and white bloc voting as critical to all vote dilution
claims. Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices,'"3 wrote a concurrence
which, among other things, expressed doubt as to the treatment of the three
Gingles factors as dispositive of a Section 2 claim. 10' Although she did not offer
specifics as to the appropriate standards for vote dilution claims, Justice O'Connor
appeared to endorse a broader approach which, in effect, would leave substantial
discretion to lower courts in choosing how to evaluate the "totality of
circumstances" in a given Section 2 case. 105 In the eight years between Gingles
and Johnson, the Court had undergone a dramatic change in personnel, 10 leading
some to fear, and others to hope, that in Johnson the Court would repudiate
Gingles and significantly restrict the circumstances under which minorities could
make out a claim of unlawful vote dilution.
The Court's decisions in three voting rights decisions from the October 1992
term, moreover, sent decidedly mixed signals about the Court's direction. 107 Some
limited reassurance about the vitality of Gingles emerged in Growe v. Emison' 08
and Voinovich v. Quilter,0 9 in which the Court addressed the open question of
how challenges to single-member-district election plans under Section 2 should be
evaluated. In those cases the Court unanimously held that plaintiffs challenging
single-member redistricting plans, like those challenging multimember or at-large
election systems, must prove the three Gingles factors as preconditions to a
successful vote dilution challenge. Those cases, however, did not face the broader
question of what other evidence, if any, was important in establishing a violation of
Section 2.110 Moreover, the Court's broadside criticism of majority-minority
103. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83. The concurrence was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist.
104. Id. at 90-95.
105. Id. at 99-102.
106. Justice Brennan, the author of Gingles, was replaced by Justice Souter. Justices Marshall, White,
and Powell were replaced by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg and Scalia, respectively.
107. See Karlan, supra note 21.
108. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
109. 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
110. The Court did not reach the broader question in Growe or Voinovich because it found the
plaintiffs' claims in those cases deficient for failure to satisfy the Gingles factors. See Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at
2655.

JOHNSON V. DE GRANDY

congressional districts in Shaw v. Reno subsequent to Growe and Voinovich
suggested that the Court might be poised for a major restructuring of Section 2
jurisprudence."1 If so, Johnson offered a ready vehicle for transforming the
interpretation of Section 2.
Gingles survived Johnson, though slightly wounded. The seven-member Johnson
majority included Justices Blackmun and Stevens, two of the Justices who had
joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Gingles, as well as Justice O'Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who had joined the O'Connor concurrence in Gingles. Justice
Souter's delicate treatment of Gingles indicates that neither end of this spectrum
was willing to concede much ground. The Johnson Court made the relatively
cautious pronouncement that proof of the Gingles factors does not, by itself,
"necessarily and in all circumstances" require judgment for the plaintiffs in a
Section 2 case.' The ultimate finding required in a Section 2 case is not whether
the Gingles factors have been satisfied, but whether members of a minority group
"have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice."11 3 The Johnson Court
acknowledged that the Gingles factors are closely related to that question, but
ruled that courts must expressly address the issue of electoral equality rather than
use the Gingles factors alone as a substitute for the statutory test:
To be sure, some § 2 plaintiffs may have easy cases, but although lack of
equal electoral opportunity may be readily imagined and unsurprising when
demonstrated under circumstances that include the three essential Gingles
factors, that conclusion must still be addressed explicitly, and without
isolating any other arguably relevant facts from the act of judgment."'
Moreover, regardless of its emphasis on Section 2's "totality of circumstances"
test, Johnson identified only one reason why judgment should have been entered
for the State despite plaintiffs' proof of the Gingles factors: proportionality
between the minority population and the number of majority-minority election
districts. Because a defense based on proportional minority representation had
been recognized in Gingles," 5 the Court was not breaking new ground in applying

111. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
112. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2657.
113. Id. at 2651 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
114. Id. at 2657.
115. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74-77.
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it to defeat the plaintiffs' claims in Johnson.
Nevertheless, dangers lurk in Johnson's discussion of the standards for assessing
Section 2 claims. Johnson's emphasis on the totality of circumstances may lead
some defendant jurisdictions to argue that the Gingles factors are now no more
important than any other factor in assessing whether an election system violates
Section 2. If district courts may assign any factor any weight they see fit in
determining claims of vote dilution, they will enjoy virtually unreviewable
authority to accept or reject a Section 2 challenge. On this reading of Johnson, the
consistent defeat of candidates preferred by a cohesive minority group might be
deemed "outweighed" by the availability of liberal voter registration opportunities
or evidence that white officeholders, though not the chosen candidates of
minorities, are occasionally willing to address minority concerns.
Such a reading of Johnson is surely incorrect. Johnson confines the "totality of
circumstances" inquiry by repeatedly emphasizing Section 2's focus on equality of
electoral opportunity. 1 16 The question is not just "what does the totality of
circumstances show?" but "what does the totality of circumstances show about
equality or inequality of electoral opportunity?" Thus, although Johnson requires
courts to treat equality or inequality of opportunity as the ultimate question, proof
of white bloc voting that consistently defeats the preferred candidates of a
politically cohesive, sizable minority group-that is, proof of the Gingles
factors-clearly speaks directly to that question. The Gingles factors, accordingly,
remain more important than others because of their direct bearing on whether
minorities have equal political opportunity under the challenged system. As a
practical matter, therefore, a district court judgment upholding a challenged
election system will still invite close appellate scrutiny in cases where minority
voters have proven that their preferred candidates consistently face defeat because
of racially polarized voting patterns-at least where the defendant jurisdiction
cannot point to majority-minority election districts which provide electoral
opportunity commensurate with the minority's population.
Voting rights litigation following the 1990 Census in several counties in
Mississippi illustrates the problems spawned when Section 2 analysis becomes
untethered from the core concept of equal electoral opportunity delineated by the
Gingles factors. In Calhoun County, Mississippi, African Americans comprise

116. E.g., id. at 2655 (stating that § 2 prohibits any practice which "'impairs the ability of a protected
class to elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters'" (quoting Volnovich v. Quilter, 113
S. Ct. at 1155)); id. at 2657 ("lack of equal electoral opportunity" is "conclusion (that] must still be
addressed explicitly").
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27 % of the population but had never, during this century, succeeded in electing an
African-American candidate as county supervisor, justice court judge, constable,
sheriff, circuit clerk, chancery clerk, tax assessor, superintendent of education,
school board member, coroner, county attorney, state senator, or state
representative. 1 17 Since 1980, 12 African-American candidates had run
unsuccessfully for a variety of these offices. The only African-American candidate
to be elected to a county-wide office during this period won an uncontested race for
a position on the election commission, in an election that took place after the
plaintiffs filed their Section 2 lawsuit." 8 The African-American plaintiffs alleged
unlawful vote dilution in the drawing of district lines used to elect county
supervisors, school board members, and election commissioners, because the
county had chosen to retain white population majorities in each of the five singlemember election districts for those offices." 9 The plaintiffs alleged that, because of
the racial bloc voting that prevailed in Calhoun County, this fragmentation of
African-American population among different districts deprived African
Americans of an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.' 20 As a
remedy, they sought the adoption of a redistricting plan containing one majority2
black election district.' '
Despite the evidence of racial bloc voting and minority electoral defeat, the
district court ruled against the plaintiffs in 1993, primarily on the ground that the
plaintiffs' proposed majority-black election district was not sufficiently compact to
satisfy the requirements of the first Gingles factor. 2 As an alternative basis for its
holding, however, the district court ruled that the "totality of circumstances" did
not establish a Section 2 violation, even assuming that plaintiffs' evidence satisfied
all of the Gingles factors. 23 The Fifth Circuit reversed both holdings in 1994 and
remanded for further proceedings, quoting with approval the following passage
from a Third Circuit decision:
[I]t will be only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the
existence of the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a

117.
118.
119.
(showing
120.
121.
122.
123.

Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Clark 11].
Id. at 94, 96.
Clark v. Calhoun County, 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. Miss. 1993) [hereinafter Clark 1]
population figures for county redistricting plan), rev'd. 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1191, 1193.
Id.
Id.at 1202.
Id.See also Clark II, 21 F.3d at 94.
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violation of § 2 under the totality of circumstances. In such cases, the district
court must explain with particularity why it has concluded, under the
particular facts of that case, that an electoral system that routinely results in
white voters voting as a bloc to defeat the candidate of choice of a politically
cohesive minority group is not violative of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 12'
Although the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling prior to the Johnson decision, a more
recent Fifth Circuit decision in another Mississippi county redistricting case,
Houston v. Lafayette County, reaffirmed the reasoning of Clark I by reversing a
district court ruling which rejected a Section 2 challenge without giving proper
weight to plaintiffs' proof of racial bloc voting. 125
On remand following the Fifth Circuit's reversal, however, the district court in
Clark v. Calhoun County relied on Johnson v. De Grandy to reject the plaintiffs'
claims a second time. The district court's remand decision in Clark acknowledged
that plaintiffs' proof satisfied all three Gingles preconditions, emphasizing that
"plaintiffs successfully proved the existence of racial bloc voting in Calhoun
County. '1 26 Moreover, African-American voters in Calhoun County clearly do not
enjoy proportional representation, given that they have never succeeded in electing
an African-American representative to the Board of Supervisors or Board of
Education. Nevertheless, citing Johnson v. De Grandy, the district court again
entered judgment for defendants, offering only the following as its analysis of the
124. Clark I, 21 F.3d at 97 (quoting Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1135). The Fifth Circuit's decision is also
noteworthy for its analysis of the impact of Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), on the analysis of
geographical compactness under Gingles factor one. The Clark court ruled that Shaw was not implicated
because "the proposed district in this case ... is not nearly as bizarre as the district under consideration in
Shaw." Clark II, 21 F.3d at 95. The Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he first Gingles precondition does not
require some aesthetic ideal of compactness, but simply that the black population be sufficiently compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district." Id. It also ruled that plaintiffs' proposed majority-black
district was not necessarily defective simply because it would combine black citizens from three different
municipalities within the county. Id. at 96. While not ruling that such considerations were irrelevant, the court
of appeals held that the district court had not adequately explained why the plaintiffs' proposed district would
prevent effective representation. Id. The Court also noted that a districting plan which is offered to satisfy the
first Gingles factor "is not cast in stone," and that the county would have an opportunity to develop its own
proposed remedial plan if a § 2 violation were found. Id. at 95. For all these reasons, the Fifth Circuit held
that a remand was necessary for further findings on the issue of compactness. Id.
125. Houston v. Lafayette County, No. 93-7750, slip op. at 3502 (5th Cir. May 4, 1995) (holding that,
where district court erred in applying Gingles factors, judgment for defendants could not be upheld based on
district court's conclusory assertion that "totality of circumstances" weighed in defendants' favor, and
vacating and remanding for further findings on totality of circumstances).
126. Clark v. Calhoun County, 881 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. Miss. 1995) [hereinafter Clark 1111, notice
of appealfiled (April 19, 1995).
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totality of circumstances:
Even though the court recognizes the important role that racial polarization
plays in the totality of the circumstances inquiry, it continues to believe that,
when all the circumstances are considered, "plaintiffs have not shown that as
a result of the adopted supervisory plan, they do not have equal opportunity to
17
participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice."'
The district court neither identified nor discussed the "circumstances" which
support the conclusion that African-American voters enjoy equal political
opportunity in Calhoun County. Apparently, the court believed that the Johnson
decision relieved it of any such responsibility, 28 notwithstanding the Fifth
Circuit's instructions that a court must "explain with particularity why it has
concluded, under the particular facts of that case, that an electoral system that
routinely results in white voters voting as a bloc to defeat the candidate of choice
of a politically cohesive minority group is not violative of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.",'2 9
Clearly, Johnson did not authorize the lower courts to dismiss proof of the
Gingles preconditions as unimportant to the Section 2 determination, without
analysis or explanation. Indeed, if the facts in Clark do not establish unequal
electoral opportunity for African Americans in majority-white election districts, it
is difficult to fathom how such a showing could be made anywhere in the United
States. And while the Clark case may be an extreme example, it is by no means
the only example of the problems faced by Section 2 plaintiffs when courts decide
to discount objective proof of repeated electoral failure faced by African-American
candidates. 2 0 Thus, even if the courts of appeals eventually rein in the lower
127. Id. at 256 (quoting Clark 1 813 F. Supp. at 1202).
128. See id. at 255 ("The possibility that plaintiffs might fail in a Voting Rights challenge even though
they prove the existence of the Gingles factors has been specifically recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Johnson v. De Grandy.").
129. Clark II, 21 F.3d at 97 (quoting Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1135).
130. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit recently reversed a similar decision entered by a district court in
a Lafayette County, Mississippi redistricting case. Houston v. Lafayette County. No. 93-7750 (5th Cir. May
4, 1995), revg 841 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Miss. 1993). See also Teague v. Attala County. 807 F. Supp. 392
(N.D. Miss. 1992) (entering judgment for defendants in § 2 case despite clear statistical proof showing that
no black candidate has ever won contested county election in white-majority election district), rev'd and
remanded 17 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that district court must enter "revised findings of fact and
conclusions of law that will directly evaluate appellants' statistical evidence and will more comprehensively
refer to the other evidence in the record, tying that evidence directly to the Glngles preconditions .... ") on
remand, No. I: 91CV209-D-D (memorandum opinion March 20, 1995) (entering judgment for defendants,
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courts' more extreme interpretations of Johnson,31 the decision has undeniably
introduced a greater degree of uncertainty into Section 2 litigation in the short
run.
Johnson also muddies the waters somewhat by suggesting a possible distinction
in the treatment of at-large or multimember districts, on the one hand, and singlemember district election systems, on the other. Thornburg v. Gingles involved a
Section 2 challenge to multimember legislative districts, in which the plaintiffs
alleged that minority voting strength was submerged through the use of at-large
voting to elect multiple legislators from the same district. Johnson involved a
Section 2 challenge to single-member legislative districts, alleging that district
lines had been drawn in a manner that unfairly fragmented minority population
and limited the number of majority-minority districts. While not drawing a
formal, brightline distinction between these two types of challenges, Johnson
suggests that the Gingles factors may sometimes carry more weight in
multimember or at-large election challenges than in single-member district
challenges, "where dilution may be more difficult to grasp."' 8 As Johnson
explained:
Plaintiffs challenging single-member districts may claim, not total [minority]
despite clear statistical proof of severely racially polarized voting, in reliance on anecdotal testimony of elected
officials stating that race is unimportant to voters, and in reliance on alternative holding that "totality of
circumstances" warranted judgment for defendants even if plaintiffs satisfied Gingles factors), notice of
appealfiled (Mar. 31, 1995).
131. Like the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has also recognized that, even after Johnson, the Gingles
factors remain the principle battleground in § 2 challenges to allegedly dilutive election systems. See Cane v.
Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921, 926 (4th Cir. 1994) (in affirming finding of § 2 violation, court notes that
district court had found in favor of plaintiffs on the Gingles factors and mentions only one other factor: the
district court's finding that Maryland employed racially discriminatory voting practices in the 19th and early
20th century), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1097 (1995). See also, e.g., Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807
(6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting § 2 challenge to at-large city council elections based primarily on holding that
plaintiffs failed to prove legally significant white bloc voting under Gingles), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1960
(1995).
An Eleventh Circuit decision handed down after Johnson rejected a § 2 challenge to at-large elections for
state trial judges, holding that the state's interest in maintaining at-large elections outweighed the proof of
vote dilution adduced in that case. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11 th Cir. 1994) (en bane), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995). See also Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 1995) (vacating judgment
in favor of § 2 plaintiffs challenging at-large judicial elections, and remanding for further findings as to
whether the proof of vote dilution outweighs the state's interest in maintaining at-large judicial elections). In
the view of this author, who was co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Nipper, these decisions probably have
relatively little to do with the impact of Johnson, but simply reflect the unique treatment that has been
afforded to judicial election challenges by some federal courts.
132. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2658.
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submergence, but partial submergence; not the chance for some electoral
success in place of none, but the chance for more success in place of some.
When the question... comes down to the reasonableness of drawing a series
of district lines in one combination of places rather than another, judgments
about inequality may become closer calls. As facts beyond the ambit of the
three Gingles factors loom correspondingly larger, factfinders cannot rest
uncritically on assumptions about the force of the Gingles factors in pointing
to dilution. 1as
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Growe v. Emison'3 ' presaged a possible
distinction between challenges to at-large or multimember district challenges, on
the one hand, and challenges to single-member redistricting plans, on the other,
when it rejected the minority plaintiffs' argument that proof of the Gingles factors
should not be a prerequisite in the latter type of Section 2 challenge:
We have... stated on many occasions that multimember districting plans, as
well as at-large plans, generally pose greater threats to minority-voter
participation in the political process than do single-member districts-which
is why we have strongly preferred single-member districts for federal-courtordered reapportionment.13 5
Interestingly, if any Justice appears to have demurred from the notion that
elections from single-member districts are presumptively less injurious to minority
voters than at-large or multimember elections, it is Justice O'Connor. Her
concurrence in Gingles acknowledged that "the at-large or multimember district
has an inherent tendency to submerge the votes of the minority," but went on to
state that "[t]here is no difference in principle" in the effect that at-large and
single-member-district plans may have on minority voting power: "[t]he type of
districting selected and the way in which district lines are drawn can have a
powerful effect on the likelihood that members of a geographically and politically
cohesive minority group will be able to elect candidates of their choice."' 30 Justice

133. Id.; id. at 2657 n.10 (stating that "challenges to multimember districts are likely to be the easier
plaintiffs' cases," although proof of sustained proportional minority representation may also defeat such a
challenge).
134. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
135. Id. at 1084 (citations omitted).
136. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 87 (O'Connor, J.. concurring in judgment). It is therefore somewhat
surprising that Justice Scalia, in Growe v. Emison. cites these very passages in Justice O'Connor's Gingles
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O'Connor's concurrence in Johnson again takes pains to draw attention to the
potentially injurious effect of district lines on minorities, declaring that "[1]ack of
proportionality is probative evidence of vote dilution," and defining proportionality
as "the relationship between the number of majority-minority voting districts and
187
the minority group's share of the relevant population."
Justice O'Connor would appear to have the better of this debate, if indeed there
is one. The manner in which district lines are drawn can limit minority voting
strength just as effectively as the use of at-large elections, and there is little basis
for recognizing any per se distinction between the two types of vote dilution
claims. Nevertheless, some distinction between challenges to these different types
of election systems may be suggested by the Court's disposition of several Section
2 cases that were pending on petitions for certiorari (or direct appeal) at the time
the Court decided Johnson. Three such cases were pending: two involved
challenges to single-member district plans, and one involved a challenge to at-large
school board elections.' 38 In the two single-member district cases, the Court
vacated the lower court decisions and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Johnson.'3 9 This is the Supreme Court's standard procedure in cases that have
been held pending the issuance of a plenary decision, if there is any plausible basis
to believe that the Supreme Court's plenary decision might affect the proper
disposition of the case. " 0 In the at-large election challenge, however, the Court
denied the petition for certiorari after issuing its decision in Johnson, even though
concurrence as support for his statement that at-large elections are inherently more dangerous for minority
voters than single-member districts. Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1084.
137. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2664.
138. Compare African American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 999 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of summary judgment against minority plaintiffs in vote dilution challenge to St.
Louis City Council districts because plan provided proportional representation to minorities), cert. granted,
vacated and remanded sub noa. Tyus v. Bosley, 114 S. Ct. 2776 (1994) and Rural West Tennessee AfricanAmerican Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 836 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding that AfricanAmerican plaintiffs proved unlawful vote dilution in one portion of Tennessee legislative redistricting plan but
not in another portion where African Americans already enjoyed proportional representation), vacated and
remanded. 114 S. Ct. 2775 (1994) with Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1103 (holding, among other things, that challenge
to at-large school board elections was not barred by record of proportional electoral success, where electoral
success was attributable to special circumstances), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2779 (1994).
139. African American Voting Rights Legal Defense, Inc. v. Villa, 114 S. Ct. 2776 (1994); Rural West
Tennesse African-American Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 114 S. Ct. 2775 (1994). Late in the 1993
Term, the Court also vacated and remanded, in light of Johnson, yet another decision on a § 2 challenge to a
single-member redistricting scheme. See Bridgeport Coalition for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport,
26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir.), vacatedfor reconsideration in light of Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S.Ct. 1647 (1994).
140. Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court's Second Thoughts: Remands for Reconsideration and
Denials of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 5.23 (1983),
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the court of appeals had ruled that proof of the Gingles factors will ordinarily
require judgment for the plaintiffs in a Section 2 action.,
B.

Section 2 and Proportionalityof Representation
Much of the Johnson opinion is devoted to explaining that proportionality or

disproportionality of minority representation, standing alone, is not dispositive of a
Section 2 claim. What the Supreme Court did in Johnson, however, may speak
more loudly than what it said. The Court's only explanation for reversing the

district court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs-a judgment ostensibly protected by
the "clearly erroneous" standard of review 42 -- was that Hispanics in South
Florida have roughly proportional representation under Senate Joint Resolution

2G.143 One may comb the opinion in vain for any fact, other than proportionality
of representation, that supported a judgment for the defendants in Johnson. At the
same time, although portions of Johnson may be read as de-emphasizing the
importance of the Gingles factors, the Court identifies only one circumstance that
141. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Jenkins, 114 S. Ct. 2779 (1994). Although it is hazardous to
attribute any significance to the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari, the Hellman study suggests that a
denial of certiorari after a petition has obviously been held pending the issuance of a plenary decision is a
special case. Hellman, supranote 140, at 23 ("as the findings of this study suggest, the Court ordinarily issues
reconsideration orders whenever the lower court's ruling is even arguably vitiated by the intervening decision
and denies review only when the judgment is perceived as clearly in accord with the plenary opinion").
142. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79. The Johnson Court skirted this problem through the following
formulation: "Because the ultimate finding of dilution in districting for the Florida House was based on a
misreading of the governing law, we hold it to be clearly erroneous." Johnson. 114 S. CL at 2662. To be sure,
Gingles permits reversal of a district court decision in a vote dilution case which is based on a
misunderstanding of governing law. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79. However, when a district court has applied an
erroneous legal standard, the usual rule calls for a reversal and remand to permit the district court to
reconsider its ruling in light of the proper legal standard, except when the record so decisively favors the
appellant as to require judgment in the appellant's favor as a matter of law. Pullman-Standard v. Swint. 456
U.S. 273, 291 (1982). Thus, in reversing outright, the Court in Johnson necessarily concluded that the
evidence of proportional representation outweighed everything else that might be brought to bear under the
"totality of circumstances" test.
143. This is true of the Court's judgment reversing the district court's finding of a § 2 violation in the
redistricting plan for the House of Representatives; it is also true of the Court's judgment upholding the
district court's denial of relief to minority plaintiffs who challenged the State Senate redistricting plan. The
Court's total discussion of the Senate plan is as follows: "[a]s in the case of the House districts, the totality of
circumstances appears not to support a finding of vote dilution here, where both minority groups (blacks and
Hispanics] constitute effective voting majorities in a number of State Senate districts substantially
proportional to their share in the population, and where plaintiffs have not produced evidence otherwise
indicating that under SJR 2-G voters in either minority group have 'less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.' 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b)." Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2663.
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has ever justified a judgment for defendants when plaintiffs have succeeded in
14
proving all three Gingles factors-again, proportional minority representation.
Protesting all the way that proportionality is not dispositive, Johnson nevertheless
gives proportionality of minority representation an importance that was only
hinted at in Thornburg v. Gingles.
Indeed, prior to Johnson, some lower courts applying amended Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act had relentlessly criticized any suggestion that a proportional
number of majority-minority election districts could serve as a norm against which
to measure vote dilution-even a norm which is "relevant" but not "dispositive",
as Justice O'Connor described it.'" 5 These courts typically cited the "proportional
representation" disclaimer in the text of amended Section 2146 as if it condemned
any lawsuit whose result would be to assure minorities the opportunity to elect
candidates in numbers proportional to minority population.147 Needless to say,
such an interpretation leads to absurd consequences. Increased electoral
opportunity for minority voters is the likely result of any successful vote dilution
challenge to an election scheme, and the cause of action created in Section 2
otherwise would have little purpose.
The majority opinion in Johnson refuted this misreading of Section 2's
proportional representation disclaimer:
"Proportionality" as the term is used here links the number of majorityminority voting districts to minority members' share of the relevant
population. The concept is distinct from the subject of the proportional
representation clause of § 2, which provides that "nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
144. Other than Johnson, the only case identified by the Court where judgment was entered for
defendants despite proof of all three Gingles factors is Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d
357 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 2334 (1993), a case where plaintiffs' § 2 challenge was rejected
because the challenged election plan provided black voters with seven majority-black single-member districts,
a number of districts which was proportional to the black population. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2663,
145.

Johnson, 114 S.Ct. at 2664.

146. Section 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), provides, in part:
The extent to which members of the protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.
Id.
147. See, e.g., Teague v. Attala County, Mississippi, 807 F. Supp. 392, 404 (N.D. Miss. 1992) ("The
Voting Rights Act never was intended as a vehicle for creating 'safe' black or other minority seats." (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b)), rev'd and remanded, 17 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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equal to their proportion in the population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). This
proviso speaks to the success of minority candidates, as distinct from the
148
political or electoral power of minority voters.
Thus, it does not run afoul of Section 2's proportional representation disclaimer to
examine the number of majority-minority electoral districts in a redistricting plan
as relevant evidence in determining a vote dilution claim. Majority-minority
election districts do not guarantee minority electoral success, but merely permit
minority voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to office."10 This
exposition in Johnson helps greatly in restoring the proportional representation
disclaimer of Section 2 to its rightful place. The proviso means that Section 2
plaintiffs cannot win simply by pointing to an absence of minority elected officials,
but it does not mean that a lawsuit requesting the creation of majority-minority
single-member districts is an illegitimate demand for proportional representation
which is contrary to the intent of Congress.
C. The Concurring Opinions of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy: A Split in
the Shaw Majority
An intriguing feature of the Johnson opinion lies in the clash between Justice
O'Connor's and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno, S00 and Justice Kennedy was one of the four
Justices to join her opinion in that case. In Johnson, however, the two Justices
pointedly agreed to disagree.
In Johnson, Justice O'Connor joined Justice Souter's majority opinion in its
entirety, and wrote separately to emphasize what she deemed the central point:
"proportionality-defined as the relationship between the number of majorityminority voting districts and the minority group's share of the relevant population-is always relevant evidence in determining vote dilution, but is never itself
dispositive.''115 Indeed, the Justice O'Connor of Shaw is virtually unrecognizable in

148. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2658 n.l1.
149. Empirical analysis of election outcomes demonstrates that voters in majority black election districts
are likely to elect a black candidate to office. Quitr REvOLUTION. supra note 93. at 338 & TABLE I IS.

Nevertheless, voters in a majority-minority election district remain free to support non-minority candidates. In
fact, the empirical evidence indicates a somewhat greater likelihood that black-majority districts %ill elect a
white candidate than that white-majority districts will elect a black candidate. Id.
150. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
151. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2664.
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her opinion in Johnson. Although both cases address majority-minority election
districts, the unrelentingly pejorative characterization of such districts in Shaw is
completely absent from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Johnson. In Shaw v.
Reno, Justice O'Connor condemned districts "obviously . . . created solely to

effectuate

the perceived

"balkaniz[ing],"'

53

common

interests of one racial

group" '

as

'

as "segregation," " and (most remarkably) as "political

apartheid."' 55 In Johnson, a year later, she asserts that the absence of a
proportional number of majority-minority districts in a legislative redistricting
plan, while not dispositive, "is probative evidence of vote dilution;" indeed, "can
constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution."

'

Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Johnson makes no mention of the larger
question of the constitutional validity of race-conscious line drawing. But the
obvious way for a state legislature to avoid the kind of "probative evidence of vote
dilution"'' 7 that results from a lack of proportional representation is to create
majority-minority election districts-that is, to draw districts in a race-conscious
manner.' 5 8 Nothing in Justice O'Connor's Johnson concurrence suggests that she
is troubled by the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts, notwithstanding her strongly worded cautions about race-conscious line-drawing in Shaw.
Justice O'Connor's silence on the relationship between Section 2 and the
Fourteenth Amendment is all the more puzzling because Justice Kennedy, in his
Johnson concurrence, took pains to point out the connection. 15 9 Justice Kennedy
refused to join significant portiong of the majority opinion in Johnson, and wrote
152. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
153. Id. at 2832.
154. Id.
155. Id. The absence of empirical support for Shaw's characterization of majority-minority districts has
been extensively noted. See, in addition to authorities cited supra note 21, Brenda Wright, Analysis: The
Myths Behind Shaw v. Reno, VOTING RIGHTS REVIEW 13 (Fall 1993).
156. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. As Justice Kennedy noted:
Operating under the constraints of a statutory regime in which proportionality has some relevance,
States might consider it lawful and proper to act with the explicit goal of creating a proportional
number of majority-minority districts in an effort to avoid § 2 litigation. Likewise, a court finding a
§ 2 violation might believe that the only appropriate remedy is to order the offending State to engage
in race-based redistricting and create a minimum number of districts in which minorities constitute a
voting majority. The Department of Justice might require (in effect) the same as a condition of
granting preclearance, under § 5 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, to a State's proposed legislative
redistricting.
Id. at 2666 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
159. Id.
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separately to warn that if proportionality of minority representation is relevant in
determining liability under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, then Section 2 is a
statute fostering race-conscious governmental action-action that "raises the most
serious constitutional questions."160 Justice Kennedy wished to make it clear that
he does not read Johnson as resolving the constitutionality of Section 2, because
"no constitutional claims were brought here."161 According to Justice Kennedy,
the primary authority calling into question the race-conscious standards embodied
in Section 2 is Shaw v. Reno. 6 2 In Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Johnson,
however, Shaw did not merit so much as a citation. 6 ' The intriguing divergence
between these two Justices in their treatment of Shaw suggests lingering tensions
among the five-member majority in Shaw as the Court confronts the Georgia and
Louisiana congressional redistricting cases argued during the 1994 term.0w

CONCLUSION

Johnson reflects the jurisprudence of compromise. Justice Souter's majority
opinion in Johnson was crafted carefully enough to hold the votes of several
Justices who were bitterly divided in Shaw v. Renot"' and Holder v.Hall,"o' the
Court's other most recent voting rights decisions prior to the 1994 term.
Inevitably, a compromise decision sends mixed messages.
The mixed messages of Johnson revolve around proportionality of representation
and its role in Section 2 litigation and, more generally, in the redistricting
decisions made by state legislatures. The Court upheld Florida's legislative
redistricting plan against the minority plaintiffs' claims, finding that the plan
afforded proportional representation to minority voters and that the plaintiffs had
not otherwise demonstrated unequal opportunity.""7 According to Johnson,
examining the number of majority-minority election districts as one measure of
equal electoral opportunity does not contravene the proviso in Section 2 which

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2666.
Id. at 2667.
Id. at 2666-67.
Id. at 2664.
See supra note 2.
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2658-60.
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disclaims an automatic right to proportional electoral success.'0 8 At the same time,
lack of proportionality does not create a per se right to relief under Section 2.109
And to further complicate Johnson's message, the Court emphasizes that states do
not enjoy automatic immunity from a Section 2 claim by creating a proportional
number of majority-minority election districts, notwithstanding the Court's
disposition of the plaintiffs' claims in Johnson.' ° Thus, even when a protected
minority comprises a majority of the population in a proportional number of
election districts, Johnson holds that members of the minority group still may have
an actionable injury under Section 2, although the Court does not define the
potential injury with any clarity.' 7 '
Similarly, Johnson blurs, rather than obliterates, the role of the so-called
Thornburg v. Gingles factors in Section 2 litigation. Although emphasizing that
proof of the Gingles factors does not automatically require judgment for
defendants, 7 2 the Court did not identify any factor other than the proportional
number of majority-minority election districts in South Florida which required
rejection of the plaintiffs' claim in Johnson. In cases where such proportionality is
absent, Johnson does not provide any precise rationale for rejecting the Section 2
claims of plaintiffs who can prove that racially polarized voting generally prevents
a cohesive minority group from electing its preferred representatives to office.
Nevertheless, Johnson's emphasis on the "totality of circumstances," an inherently
open-ended concept, injects a source of uncertainty into Section 2 litigation which
cannot help but make vote dilution litigation more costly, more time consuming,
and more unpredictable in result.'73
The Johnson Court's cautious pronouncements on proportionality attempt to
steer a middle course on the charged issue of redistricting and race, but the
resulting instructions to state legislatures that may wish to avoid vote dilution
litigation under Section 2 are simply unclear. Justice O'Connor was surely right in
Johnson to point out that lack of proportionality, although not dispositive, "can
constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution" in a Section 2 vote dilution challenge
to a redistricting plan.17 4 Indeed, the historic gains for minority representation
which followed the 1990s round of redistricting made it clearer than ever that
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 2658 n.l1.
Id. at 1664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2661.
Id.
Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2657.
Id. at 2656-57; see supra text accompanying notes 94-131.
Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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majority-minority election districts are responsible for securing equal political
opportunity for minority voters and for bringing racial integration to elected bodies
throughout the nation.17 But the Court also appears poised to open a wide new
area for potential Fourteenth Amendment challenges to congressional and state
legislative redistricting plans that intentionally include majority-minority districts,
as witnessed by Shaw. If Section 2 commands that thou shall not dilute, but the
Supreme Court commands that thou shall not deliberately draw districts with
majority-minority populations, state legislatures may well conclude that the
purpose of drawing a redistricting plan is mainly to provide target practice for
federal court litigants.
Indeed, Johnson, read together with Shaw, presents a puzzle not only for state
legislatures, but for Court-watchers of every stamp. A six-member majority of the
Court recognizes that "society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate
7
majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity,"'
but a five-member majority of the Court appears ready to treat the deliberate
drawing of such districts as an inherently suspect racial classification.' 7 Given
that the Court's membership is still nine, the recent voting rights jurisprudence
suggests a Court whose members are deeply divided not just against each other,
but against themselves, in understanding how electoral equality is possible in a
race-conscious society.

175. See. e.g.. supra notes 4 and 93 and sources cited therein.
176. Johnson, 114 S.Ct. at 2661.
177. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2818. 2832.

